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Hedge-to-Arrive Contracts: Jurisdictional

Issues Under the Commodity Exchange Act
JENNIFER DURHAM KING*

& JAMES J. MOYLAN'*

INTRODUCrION

When federal legislation and unusual real-world developments collide,
litigation ensues. This was certainly true in the agricultural arena during the
summer of 1996. The Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of
1996 brought dramatic changes to a variety of federal agricultural support programs.! In response, more sophisticated and flexible cash forward contracts
were developed, among those are the Hedge-to-Arrive ("HTA") contracts.'
At the same time, grain prices soared to record levels in the summer of
1996.' Something had to give, and give it did, as the usually friendly
relationship between farmers and grain elevator operators turned to outright
warfare in the courts.
The first judicial opinion issued from this conflagration is In re Grain
Land Coop Cases.4 In Grain Land, the Minnesota federal district court held
that the HTA contracts at issue were cash forward contracts, not futures
contracts.5 Thus, they are outside the scope of the Commodity Exchange Act
("CEA")6 and the regulatory jurisdiction of the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission ("CFTC").
I. BACKGROUND
Section 2(a)(1)(A) of the CEA grants the CFTC exclusive jurisdiction
over, "accounts, agreements.., and transactions involving contracts of sale
*
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B.A. 1989, Miami University of Ohio; J.D. 1998, liT Chicago-Kent College of
B.S. B.A. 1969, University of Denver; J.D. 1971, University of Denver, College of

1. Pub. L. No. 104-127, 110 Stat. 888 (1996).

2. David C. Barrett,Jr., Hedge-to-Arrive Contracts, 2 DRAKE J. AGRic. L. 153, 154

(Spring 1997).
3. See, e.g., David Nusbaum, Higher Prices, Higher Risk for Grain Hedgers,
FuTUREs, June 1, 1996, at 66. See also Scott Kilman, As Corn PricesSoar, a Futures Tactic
Brings Rancor to Rural Towns, WALL ST. J.,
July 2, 1996, at Al.
4. 978 F. Supp. 1267 (D. Minn. 1997).
5. Id. at 1273.
6. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-7672 (1995) [hereinafter CEA].
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of a commodity for future delivery, traded or executed on a contract market."7
Excluded from this definition are, "cash forward contracts . . .," which are
identified as, "any sale of any cash commodity for deferred shipment or
delivery .... Thus, cash forward contracts, excluded from the definition of
"futures contracts," are beyond the regulatory jurisdiction of the CFTC. Both
"futures contracts" and "cash forward contracts" are terms of art and are not
specifically defined in the CEA.9
The exclusion of "cash forward contracts" from the definition of "futures
contract" originated in the Future Trading Act, enacted in 1921.'0 The Future
Trading Act was designed to curb excessive speculation and price manipulation in the grain futures markets by imposing prohibitive taxes on all futures
contracts except those future delivery contracts entered into by owners and
growers of grain, owners and renters of land upon which the grain was grown,
and associations of such persons." Section 4(b) of the Future Trading Act
exempted future delivery contracts traded by members of a board of trade or
regulated by the Secretary of Agriculture, from the
a contract market,
2
prohibitive tax.
When the Future Trading Act of 1921 was declared unconstitutional as
an impermissible attempt to regulate through the taxing power,13 Congress
immediately responded by enacting the Grain Futures Act of 1922, which
regulated grain futures trading under the Commerce Clause of the U.S.5
Constitution.' 4 This Act was held constitutional in Boardof Trade v. Olson.'
The cash forward contract exception was carried forward to the Grain
Futures Act without change. The 1936 amendments to the CEA broadened the
to sales of "any cash commodity" for
exclusion beyond "grains" to apply
6
deferred shipment or delivery.'
The cash forward contract exclusion was created for farmers who wanted
to sell part or all of the next season's harvest at a set price to a grain elevator
or miller to generate cash. Both parties are guaranteed a price in these
",

7.

7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A) (1995).

8. Id.

9.
10.

See CFTC v. Noble Metals Int'l, Inc., 67 F.3d 766, 772 n.4 (9th Cir. 1995).
Pub. L. No. 66-67, 42 Stat. 187 (1921) (held unconstitutional in Hill v. Wallace,

11.
12.
13.
14.

Section 4(a) of the Future Trading Act, Pub. L. No. 66-67 § 2, 42 Stat. 187 (1921).
Section 4(b) of the Future Trading Act, Pub. L. No. 66-67 § 4, 42 Stat. 187 (1921).
See Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 66-67 (1922).
42 Stat. 998 (1922) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-7672 (1922)).

16.

49 Stat. 1491 (1936) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1995)).

259 U.S. 44 (1922)).

15.

262 U.S. 1, 33 (1923).
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transactions, but delivery is delayed until the crop is harvested and the
17
elevator or miller has capacity to process the grain.
The distinguishing characteristic between legitimate cash forward
contracts and illegal, off-exchange futures contracts, is the set price and
delivery obligation. As the Noble Metals court observed, "The cash forward
contract exclusion is unavailable to contracts of sale for commodities which
are sold merely for speculative purposes and which are not predicated upon
the expectation that delivery of the actual commodity by the seller to the
original contracting buyer will occur in the future."' 8 These historical
legislative guideposts and judicial interpretations provide the basis for the
analysis of the HTA contract components in Grain Land.
I. GRAIN LAND
In 1993, Grain Land Coop ("Grain Land"), an agricultural cooperative
association located in southern Minnesota, began promoting HTA contracts
as one of a variety of marketing arrangements it offered to its members, in
addition to its regular grain elevator and agricultural services business.' 9
Grain Land's customers were local farmers and producers of grain and other
agricultural commodities ("Producers").2'
Traditionally, the Producers sold their grain to Grain Land either for
cash, with delivery of the grain occurring immediately at the time of sale, or
via a contract specifying a certain price to be paid for the grain, but with
actual delivery deferred to some future date.2 1 Grain Land would then resell
the grain, crediting some of the profit to its member-Producers. 22
HTA contracts also involve the sale of a fixed quantity of grain at a fixed
price for deferred delivery. The Producer is allowed to set one component of
the contract price, the "basis," at some future date prior to the delivery date.23
Both parties also set a per-unit price based on the price of a futures contract
for a month within the crop's marketing year on the Chicago Board of Trade
("CBOT").2 4 The contract price is the sum of these two components.25
These contracts provide the Producers flexibility in the delivery terms of
the contract by allowing them to roll forward the actual delivery date of the
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

25.

See CFTC v. Co-Petro Mktg. Group, Inc., 680 F.2d 573, 577-78 (9th Cir. 1982).
67 F.3d 766, 772 (citing Co-Petro, 680 F.2d at 579).
Grain Land, 978 F. Supp. at 1269.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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26 Consegrain, postponing their delivery obligations until a later month.
quently, the HTA contract calls for "offsetting" to minimize the effect of any
price fluctuations.2 7 Grain Land would hedge its grain position by selling
2
short the corresponding grain futures contract on the CBOT. " In order to do
so, Grain Land had to deposit and maintain a margin account with a futures
29
commission merchant ("FCM") member of the CBOT. The nature of the
HTA contract obligated Grain Land to cover the margin obligations of the
corresponding hedge transactions.3" Thus, if the value of the corresponding
futures position indreased due to a rise in the price of the grain futures, Grain
Land had to make'an additional deposit of equity to maintain the short
position on margin.3 '
Grain Land promoted the HTA contracts to the local farming communities as offering the Producers flexibility in the delivery and pricing of their
grain." As a result of its marketing efforts, thousands of HTA contracts were
executed between the Producers as seller, and Grain Land as buyer, resulting
33
in the routine delivery of millions of bushels of corn and soybeans.
When grain prices began a steady rise in October 1994, many of the
member-Producers of Grain Land Coop opted to defer or roll the delivery date
of the grain that was subject to the HTA contracts.3 ' As a result, Grain Land
had to cover not only the cost associated with the deferred delivery commitments, but the increasing margin deposit required with respect to maintaining
the short futures contract hedge positions in the face of increasing market
prices.35 The adverse economics of the situation caused Grain Land to notify
all of its Producers with whom it had executed HTA contracts that it was
terminating the existing contracts, and would require the Producers to execute

26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. A short position is defined as: "(1) One who has sold futures contracts or the
cash commodity (depending upon the market under discussion) and has not yet offset that
position; or (2) The action of taking a position in which one has sold futures contracts (or the
cash commodity) without taking the offsetting action." NATIONAL FUTURES ASSOCIATION,
GLOSSARY OF FUTURES TERMS 29 (1988). For a background on the mechanics of commodity
futures trading see Donna C. Leeker & James J. Moylan, Private Rights of Action Under the
Commodity Exchange Act-The Supreme Court Decides, 16 J. MARSHALL L. REO'. 307, 308-10
(Spring 1983).
32. Grain Land, 978 F. Supp. at 1269.
33. Id. at 1270.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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must honor the existing
new ones.36 The Producers countered that Grain Land 37
contracts, or they would file breach of contract suits.
Grain Land ultimately responded that it would honor its contractual
obligations, including the Producers' right to roll each contract until it
expired. 3' However, it would also require those Producers wishing to roll the
contract beyond December 1996 to notify Grain Land prior to June 25, 1996,
and to execute a new contract in order to do So. 3' The Producers subsequently
informed Grain Land that they would not execute new contracts. 40 Upon
expiration of the HTA contracts, the Producers did not make timely delivery
of the contracted grain.4 ' Accordingly, Grain Land filed suit in December
1996 against approximately 160 Producers that were parties to the HTA
contracts, in various Minnesota state district courts.42 The Producers had the
cases consolidated and removed to federal court on federal question jurisdiction.43
The essence of Grain Land's seven-count complaint is that the Producers
were in breach of the HTA contracts by failing to deliver the grain as and
when required. 4" Grain Land sought a declaratory judgment that the HTA
contracts were exempt from the jurisdiction of the CFTC by the forward
contract exclusion in the CEA.45 Such a finding would enable Grain Land to
assert that the HTA contracts were enforceable against the Producers under
state contract law. Alternatively, Grain Land asked the court to find that even
if the HTA contracts were found to be futures contracts, they should still be
enforced. 6 Grain Land sought specific performance or damages for the
Producers' failure to deliver the grain, on the breach of contract theory and on
other theories set forth in the complaint.47
The Producers filed an eleven-count claim against Grain Land, alleging
both state and federal causes of action.' The Producers thrust was to obtain
a declaratory judgment that the HTA contracts were actually futures

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1270-71.
Id. at 1271. A third party indemnification complaint was also filed by Grain Land

48.

Id.

and met with a counterclaim for indemnity against Grain Land. Id.
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contracts. 49 Therefore, they would be subject to the CEA.50 If so, the HTAs
would be illegal as off-exchange futures contracts, and unenforceable. 5 Grain
Land could also be liable for fraud under the CEA. 2 The Producers also
alleged breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and common law fraud
based on misrepresentation." The Producers sought rescission of the HTA
contracts and corresponding damages. 4
Cross motions for summary judgment were filed on a number of the
parties' counts. However, the court determined that it had to decide a
fundamental issue first: whether the HTA contracts at issue were cash
forward contracts for deferred delivery, or contracts for the sale of a
commodity for future delivery. 5 If the former, the HTA contracts were
exempt from the CEA. If the latter, the HTA contracts would be covered by
the CEA, and subject to CFTC jurisdiction.56
After examining the legislative history of the forward contract exclusion,
the court concluded that the HTA contracts at issue did fit within the
exclusion. Thus, they were not subject to the CEA.57 The court based its
decision on a number of factors specific to the structure of these HTA
contracts as well as the corresponding relationship between Grain Land and
its member-Producers. The court focused primarily on the fact that the
contracts were entered into between two parties who engaged in the business
of grain production, delivery, and receipt, i.e., commercial operators.5" Both
the Producers' and Grain Land's primary business involved agricultural
products and services. The Producers harvested the grain and had the ability
to make delivery of it. Grain Land had the ability and capacity to take
delivery and relied upon the receipt of the grain in order to satisfy its own
issue contemcontractual obligations. The nature of the HTA contracts at 59
plated actual delivery and receipt of the grain subject to them.
While the Grain Land court was the first to determine that HTA
contracts, like those structured between Grain Land and the Producers, fell
under the definition of "cash forward contracts" and were not "futures
contracts," distinguishing between these instruments remains difficult and has
49.

Id.

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1273.
Id.
Id.

50.

Id.
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been the subject of many judicial and CFTC administrative decisions.' The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the distinction between a futures
contract and a cash forward contract in Co-Petroand Noble Metals. In both
cases the Ninth Circuit focused its discussion on the terms of the contracts in
light of the legislative history creating the forward contract exclusion.
In Co-Petro, the defendant offered and sold contracts for the future
purchase of certain petroleum products pursuant to a written agreement.6'
However, the contracts did not require the buyer to take actual delivery of the
fuel. Co-Petro, as agent, would sell the fuel on behalf of the buyer at some
later date. The buyer would either make or lose money depending on the price
movement of fuel between the dates of purchase and sale.62
Noble Metals involved contracts for the purchase and sale of precious
metals .63 The contracts were offered to the general public, and involved the
64
"right" to take delivery of a certain quantity of the metals at a specific price.
However, instead of taking delivery, a buyer would sell the commodity to a
third-party agent, who would actually take delivery. Again, the actual delivery
and receipt of the underlying commodity as between the original contracting
parties never occurred.6 5
In both cases, the Ninth Circuit found that the contracts were indeed
futures contracts that were under the jurisdiction of the CEA and properly
regulated by the CFTC. 6' In attempting to distinguish between futures and
forward contracts, the Co-Petrocourt held that:
[T]his exclusion [for sales of cash commodities for deferred
shipment or delivery] ... is unavailable to contracts of sale
for commodities which are sold merely for speculative
purposes and which are not predicated upon the expectation
that delivery of the actual commodity by the seller to the
original contracting buyer will occur in the future.67
A "cash forward contract" is one in which the parties contemplate physical
transfer of the actual commodity.68

60.
61.
62.
63.

See discussion infra Part III.
680F.2d at 576.
Id.
67 F.3d at 769.

66.
67.

See id. at 882; Co-Petro, 680 F.2d at 581.
Co-Petro, 680 F.2d at 579.

64.
65.
68.

Id.
Id.

Id. at 578.
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The Producers in Grain Land asserted that the HTA contracts actually
lacked the necessary delivery requirement of the forward contract exclusion
because the terms permitted indefinite rolling of the delivery date.69 The
court, however, looked to the past dealings of the parties to find that although
the Producers had the option to defer actual delivery, this feature of the HTA
contracts did not "fatally detract from the instruments' principal purpose."70
The court noted that on its face, the HTA contracts contemplated delivery.7'
In practice, millions of bushels of grain were regularly delivered.72 It also
noted that while the hedging and pricing features of the contracts may have
made them more speculative, those features alone did not remove these HTAs
from the forward contract exclusion.73
In a recent, two-pronged Statement of Policy and Statement of Guidance,
the CFTC addressed the issue of rolling delivery requirements in the context
of HTA contracts relying on the forward contract exclusion.74 In the
Statement of Policy, the CFTC stated:
While actual delivery of the commodity in the normal
stream of commerce historically has been a hallmark of
traditional agricultural forward contracts, and is one
element in determining whether the transaction is thereby
excluded from the Commodity Exchange Act, the failure to
deliver on an individual contract alone would not require
the Division [Trading and Markets] to conclude that the
contract did not qualify for the forward contract exclusion.75
The CFTC's accompanying Statement of Guidance, however, provided
that in order to reduce the risk inherent in certain HTA contract terms with
respect to delayed delivery and final pricing, the contract should require
mandatory delivery of a specified quantity of grain:
[B]y a specified date within the crop-year during which the
crop is harvested ... where such contracts include provisions allowing the "rolling" of reference prices, that
69. 978 F. Supp. at 1277.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1276-77.
74. See COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, DIVISION OF ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS STATEMENT OF POUCY INCONNECrION WITH THE UNWINDING OF CERTAIN EXISTING
CONTRACrS FoR THE DEuVERY OF GRAIN, AND STATEMENT OF GUIDANCE REGARDING CERTAIN
CONTRACTING PRACIES, 1996 CFTC Ltr. LEXIS 145 (May 15, 1996).
75. Id. at 145, *8.
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reference prices only be rolled . . . to a more deferred
futures contract month in the same crop-yearwithin which
the grain is, or will be, harvested .... ,, 7
The court in Grain Land, however, found that the CFTC's Statement of
Guidance offered it no value in determining the nature of the HTA contracts
at issue.77
The Ninth Circuit, in examining the legislative history of the forward
contract exclusion in Co-Petro,stated that the distinction between a futures
and a forward contract seemed to have been made by Congress in order:
[T]o meet a particular need such as that of a farmer to sell
part of next season's harvest at a set price to a grain elevator
or miller. These cash forward contracts guarantee the farmer
a buyer for his crop and provide the buyer with an assured
price. Most important, both parties to the contracts deal in
and contemplate future delivery of the actual grain.78
Fundamentally, the court's opinion in Grain Land was based on its
finding that the essential terms of the HTA contracts executed between Grain
Land and its member-Producers more closely resembled cash forward
contracts than futures contracts. Accordingly, they fell within the narrow
scope of the forward contract exclusion from coverage under the CEA.79
Because the contracts fell under the exclusion, they were not required to be
traded on a board of trade or contract market.8" Thus, they were governed by
state, not federal law.8'
Ill. CFTC ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINTS REGARDING
HEDGE-TO-ARRIVE CONTRACTS

In two recent administrative complaints involving Hedge-to-Arrive
contracts, the CFTC focused not only on the terms of the contract characteristics that it claimed closely resembled futures contracts, but also on the alleged
fraud involved in marketing the contracts and structuring their terms.82 In re

76.
77.
78.

79.

80.
81..

Id. at 145, *14-15 (emphasis added).
978 F. Supp. at 1277.
680 F.2d. at 577-78.

GrainLand, 978 F. Supp. at 1277.

Id.
Id.
82. In re Roger J. Wright, Comm. Fut. Trading Comm'n No. 97-2, 1996 WL 655807
(Nov. 13, 1996) [hereinafter Roger J. Wright]; In re Competitive Strategies for Agric., Ltd.,
[1997 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 127,215 (Comm. Fut. Trading Comm'n,
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Roger J. Wright, and In re Competitive Strategiesfor Agriculture, Ltd.,
involved the issuance of an administrative complaint by the CFTC's Division
of Enforcement, charging that the respondents promoted a version of an HTA
contract that was actually an illegal, off-exchange futures contract, in violation
of §4(a) of the CEA 3
Unlike the court in Grain Land, however, the CFTC's administrative
complaints, while addressing certain aspects of the contracts that it considered
suspect, did not primarily focus on the distinction between a forward contract
and a futures contract. Rather, the CFTC staff focused on the marketing
efforts of the individuals involved in advising the purchasers of the HTAs, and
the alleged representations and misrepresentations regarding the advice given
and the execution of the contracts themselves.8 4
In each administrative complaint, the CFTC alleged that the parties,
while soliciting the purchase of HTA contracts for the underlying delivery of
millions of bushels of grain, failed to disclose material facts and fraudulently
marketed the HTA contracts, including recommendations that their clients
enter into and subsequently roll the HTAs, frequently between crop years. 5
In Competitive Strategies, the CFTC also alleged that the respondents
fraudulently represented that the strategies involved with the HTAs were riskfree. 6 The Competitive Strategies administrative complaint similarly alleged
that the respondents did not explain either the market or credit risks involved
in their "unified marketing approach," which involved the use of the HTA
contracts, exchange traded futures contracts, and option contracts, all in an
effort to enhance the price that producers received for their grain. 7 According
to the CFTC, the respondents promised that their advice would allow their
customers to, "identify profitable pricing opportunities" and to, "obtain better
overall prices than under either cash contracts or forward contracts. 8 8 The
CFTC stated that the respondents' seminars promoted these "enhanced HTAs"
as a risk-free instrument, assuring the prospective client that even if market
conditions became unfavorable, the client could roll out of the current HTA
position until the market turned around. 9
Dec. 22, 1997) [hereinafter Competitive Strategies].
83. RogerJ. Wright, 1996 WL 655807, at *8; Competitive Strategies, [Transfer Binder]

Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH), at 45,874.
84.

Roger J. Wright, 1996 WL 655807, at *8-9; Competitive Strategies, [Transfer

85.

RogerJ. Wright, 1996 WL 655807, at *3; Competitive Strategies, [Transfer Binder]

Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH), at 45,874.

Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH), at 45,874.
86. Competitive Strategies, [Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH), at 45,874.
87. Id. at 45,874-875.
88. Jd. at 45,877.
89. Id. at 45,878; Roger J.Wright, 1996 WL 655807, at *1.
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In both administrative complaints, the CFTC maintained that at least one
of the parties involved in offering the advisory services was not properly
registered with the CFTC.9 In Roger J.Wright, the CFTC alleged that the
respondent failed adequately to inform clients of the risks involved in entering
into the HTAs, repeatedly downplaying the risks.91 The complaint stated that
the respondent had suggested that a favorable price movement was almost a
certainty, that the clients would get top dollar for their grain regardless of
which direction the market moved, assuring clients that they could not lose by
entering into the contracts. 92 As a result, many producers "were exposed to
delivery requirements that far exceeded their single-year production capacity
when the options were exercised."93
Although the CFTC complaints seemed to focus mainly on the alleged
fraud and misrepresentations of the respondents involved in the marketing of
the HTA contracts, the CFTC did set forth and discuss the characteristics of
the contracts that, in the CFTC's opinion, qualify the HTAs as futures
contracts. In both Roger J. Wright and Competitive Strategies,the contracts
involved lacked the delivery requirements necessary to rely on the forward
contract exclusion.94 The terms of the contracts permitted the indefinite
deferral of delivery by allowing the indefinite rolling of the HTA positions,
often beyond the current crop year. 95 The customers were permitted to
completely "offset" the contracts, not merely out of necessity involved from
unforeseen circumstances, but simply if the producer could not or would
rather not make delivery of the grain.96 Furthermore, the contracts often
included an express provision allowing the client to cancel or liquidate the
contract altogether without making delivery.9" Many of the contracts did not
even specify a delivery destination.98 Therefore, the CFTC alleged that no
binding delivery obligation was created by the contracts.99
90. Roger J. Wright, 1996 WL 655807, at *1; cf.Competitive Strategies, [Transfer
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH), at 45,874.
91. RogerJ. Wright, 1996 WL 655807, at *3.
92. Id. at *4.
93. Id.
94. Id. at *5; Competitive Strategies,[Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH), at
45,876.
95. RogerJ. Wright, 1996 WL 655807, at *5; Competitive Strategies, [Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH), at 45,876-877.
96. Rogeri. Wright, 1996 WL 655807, at *6; Competitive Strategies, [Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH), at 45,876-877.
97. Roger J.Wright, 1996 WL 655807, at *3, *6; Competitive Strategies, [Transfer
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH), at 45,877.
98. Competitive Strategies, [Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH), at 45,876.
99. Roger J.Wright, 1996 WL 655807, at *5; Competitive Strategies, [Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH), at 45,876.
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The CFTC also found that the purchasers of the contracts were not
limited to the actual producers of the grain subject to the contracts, but
included livestock producers, farmers with farms generally beyond the trade
area, and customers without any farmland or farm operations who could not
reasonably make delivery of the grain." ° These purchasers had neither the
intent nor the capacity to make delivery.'
Consequently, without even
attempting to show a distinction between these HTA contracts and futures
contracts, the CFTC alleged that the respondents violated §4(a) of the CEA by
02
engaging in illegal, off-exchange trading of futures contracts.
Neither administrative complaint discussed the distinction between a
forward contract and a futures contract. The complaints seemed to assume
instead that the nature of the HTAs involved put them squarely outside the
forward contract exclusion and firmly within the CEA and the jurisdiction of
the CFTC. In emphasizing the fraudulent way in which the contracts were
promoted, sold and managed, and to whom, the CFTC reinforced the idea that
one of the main purposes of the CEA is the protection of the overall commodities market as well as the investing public, while at the same time attempting
to balance the needs of the farmers and producers in permitting the use of
legitimate off-exchange techniques in the management of their agricultural
businesses.

IV. THE CFTC's ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT AGAINST GRAIN LAND
Interestingly, subsequent to the commencement of the federal court
litigation involving Grain Land and its member-Producers regarding the
repudiation and enforceability of the HTA contracts, the CFTC filed an
administrative complaint against Grain Land alleging that it had entered into
illegal off-exchange futures contracts.103 The CFTC was not a party to the
action involving Grain Land and the Producers that was decided on October
1, 1997, granting summary judgment to Grain Land on the issue of whether
the HTA contracts were enforceable." ° However, in light of that decision,
Grain Land asked the CFTC to voluntarily drop its complaint against it. The

100. Roger J. Wright, 1996 WL 655807, at *6; Competitive Strategies,[Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH), at 45,876.
101. RogerJ. Wright, 1996 WL 655807, at *5; Competitive Strategies, [Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH), at 45,876.
102. RogerJ.Wright, 1996 WL 655807, at *8; Competitive Strategies, [Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH), at 45,874, 45,879.
103. In re Grain Land Coop., Comm. Fut. Trading Comm'n No. 97-1, 1996 WL 655809
(Nov. 13, 1996).
104. GrainLand, 978 F. Supp. at 1267.
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CFTC notified
Grain Land that it would not voluntarily dismiss its
10 5
complaint.
Accordingly, Grain Land proceeded to bring an action in the Minnesota
U.S. District Court against the CFTC, seeking a writ of prohibition and/or a
writ of mandamus ordering the CFTC to dismiss the administrative complaint
in light of the decision in Grain Land."° Grain Land argued that the CFTC
was collaterally estopped from proceeding with the complaint against it, and
that the Court should enjoin the administrative hearing because the prior
decision in GrainLand dealt with the same or similar HTA contracts.'0 7
The federal district court denied Grain Land's petition, ruling that the
CFTC was not collaterally estopped from proceeding with its complaint by the
Grain Land case because it was not a party to it, the CFTC was not a
successor-in-interest to any parties involved in the case, nor were its interests
as a nonparty represented by an original party to the case.' Therefore, the
CFTC was not bound by that decision." Further, the court found that issuing
a writ of mandamus was not necessary or appropriate."0 The CFTC was
under no obligation to withdraw its complaint based on the decisions set forth
in the GrainLand case. Thus, the CFTC's administrative action against Grain
Land and its HTA contracts continues. It remains to be seen whether the
distinction between cash forward and futures contracts will be determinative
or whether the marketing of the instruments will take precedence in the
CFTC's administrative forum.
CONCLUSION

In any event, the Minnesota federal district court's decision in the Grain
Land private litigation does contribute to providing more certainty in this area,
at least with respect to dealings between commercial agricultural operators.
Commercial enterprises, such as farmers, agricultural co-operatives, grain
elevators, millers and the like, are presumably sophisticated in their agricultural dealings so they can "fend for themselves" and should not be burdened
with unnecessary government regulation. In this regard, commercial operators
should be free to negotiate the terms of cash forward contracts, denominated
as HTA contracts or otherwise, in their own commercial interests.
105. Grain Land Coop v. Commodity Fut. Trading Comm'n, [1998 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 127,240, at 45,981 (Comm. Fut. Trading Comm'n, Jan. 7, 1998).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 45,982.
108. Id. at 45,982-983.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 45,983.
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So long as such contracts are entered into for commercial and not
speculative purposes, between commercial entities, and delivery of the
commodity is reasonably certain to occur, these contracts should enjoy
freedom from the CEA and regulation by the CFTC as legitimate cash forward
contracts.
On the other hand, the CFTC must be ever vigilant to protect the
commodity futures markets, its users and participants from unscrupulous
operators. No matter how these instruments are characterized, substance must
be exalted over form, to assure that an unsuspecting public is not duped by
deceptive and fraudulent practices masquerading as exemptions or exclusions
from the regulatory scheme envisioned by Congress, in order to maintain the
integrity of the commodity futures markets.
AUTHOR'S ADDENDUM

After this article was prepared for publication, CFTC Administrative
Law Judge ("AL"), George Painter, issued his initial decision in, In the
Matter of Grain Land Coop."'
ALJ Painter found that Grain Land's HTA contracts.. were futures
contracts subject to the CEA. ALJ Painter entered a cease and desist order
against Grain Land from further violations of section 4(a) of the CEA.'13
In contrast to the Minnesota District Court opinion, AU Painter decided
that Grain Land's HTA contracts were not forward contracts because:
1.
2.
3.
4.

The Producers were not required to make delivery;
The Producers could cancel the contract, avoiding delivery;
In his view, the HTA contract language and the way the contracts
were marketed and administered, rendered them the functional
equivalent of futures contracts;
ALJ Painter also found an element of speculation because he
believed the Producers were indirectly funding positions in the
futures markets through Grain Land; and

111. (1998 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.Rep. (CCH) 127,459 (Comm. Fut. Trading
Comm'n, Nov. 6, 1998).
112. In contrast to the district court, AU Painter made it a point to identify Grain Land's
contracts as "Flex Hedge-To-Arrive ("Flex HTA") contracts." Id. at 47,177.

113.

7 U.S.C. § 6(a) (1995).

HEDGE-TO-ARRIVE CONTRACTS

1998]

5.

The terms of the HTA contracts were standardized and not
individually negotiated.""

ALJ Painter did note that "[t]he present matter is the first administrative
enforcement case brought by the Commission that has reached disposition.""' 5
The authors respectfully disagree with ALJ Painter's conclusions. As
noted in the body of the article, the authors support the CFTC's assertion of
jurisdiction over commodities related instruments, no matter how denominated, that are used to work a fraud or deceit upon the public." 6 However,
where the transaction involves commercial operators, the CFTC should
exercise self-restraint before asserting its jurisdiction.
Delivery of the commodity is the sine qua non of a forward contract.
Grain Land's HTA contracts obligated Grain Land, the creator and issuer of
the contracts, to take delivery. Grain Land had no option under its unilateral
contract."' Grain Land merely provided the Producers, its customers, the
ability to roll forward the contract with the ultimate obligation to deliver,
absent the Producer exercising the unilateral right'to cancel the contract.
Further, the Producers always possessed the ability to deliver, in sharp
contrast to the parties solicited in Roger J. Wright or Competitive Strategies.
Moreover, as the district court noted, millions of bushels were delivered under
Grain Land's contracts."' And, even the CFTC has recognized that the ability
9
to roll a delivery date is not fatal to customary forward contracts."
Grain Land, a commercial operator, is contractually free to become
unconditionally committed to take delivery of the Producers' commodities for
whatever commercial purpose motivates it to do so. The Producers are
sophisticated operators in the agricultural markets and can fend for themselves. No member of the public was involved in Grain Land's contracts, let
alone duped. The only governmental interest apparent in ALJ Painter's initial

114. Grain Land, [1998 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 27,459, at
47,191-197.
115. Id. at 47,190 (footnote omitted).
116. See, e.g., In re Stovall, (1979 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,941,
at 23,779 (Comm. Fut. Trading Comm'n, Dec. 6, 1979).

117. A unilateral contract is defined as:
[A] promise by one party or an offer by him to do a certain thing in the event
another party performs a certain act; the performance by the other party constitutes
an acceptance of the offer and the contract then becomes executed, although until
acceptance the offer may be revoked (footnote and citations omitted). 17 CJS
Bilateraland UnilateralContracts § 8 (1963 & Supp. 1998).

118.
119.

See supra text accompanying note 72.
See supra text accompanying note 76.
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decision is to extend CFTC subject matter jurisdiction over another area of
agriculture.
ALJ Painter's analysis is painstaking. Ultimately, however, it is nothing
more than an administrative agency's unrestrained effort to further extend its
jurisdiction. This effort is not warranted under the terms of these HTA
contracts, or by the identity of the commercial participants to these
contracts.

20

Grain Land has filed an appeal of ALJ Painter's initial decision to the
Commission.

120. See The Andersons, Inc. v. Horton Farms, Inc., No. 96-2353, 1998 WL 879662 (6th
Cir. Dec. 17, 1998) (citing Grain Land with approval).

